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The modern battlefield has become exceedingly complex and technology driven.  It is 
signified by highly sophisticated surveillance systems thereby resulting in reduced time 
for decision making, execution of orders and conduct of operations.  This reduced 
response time is essentially due to non-availability of requisite enemy data and 
presentation of information extracted from that data in a less understandable format.  
Modern electronic warfare (EW) systems are designed to process such information 
automatically to facilitate decision makers in better understanding of the battlefield 
situation and making quick decisions, thereby allowing more response time to the 
warfighter on the scene. 
Saudi Arabia, the thirteenth-largest nation in the world, is located in an oil rich 
region and shares its borders with Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Yemen, Jordan and the 
United Arab Emirates. This region has been in a state of conflict for many decades.  The 
Iraq–Iran war, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, Operation Enduring Freedom and Desert 
Shield, Iran’s ambitions of becoming a nuclear power, and Syria’s civil war are examples 
of recent and on-going conflicts. As a regional power, Saudi Arabia has her economic 
interests coupled with regional security.  With more than 2000 kilometers of coastline to 
defend, Saudi Arabia faces a challenge keeping economically vital sea lines of 
communication open for the export of crude oil and other petroleum products.  All these 
factors demand a high degree of operational readiness by Royal Saudi Armed forces, 
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Saudi Arabia is progressing as an economic as well as a military power in the 
Middle East. The region has been in a state of flux during the past several decades and 
has a very volatile security situation.  The Royal Saudi Armed Forces in general and 
Royal Saudi Naval Force (RSNF), in particular, shoulder a heavy responsibility for 
guarding national interests from any threat. This mission cannot be accomplished without 
equipping the RSNF with essential military hardware. The modern battlefield has become 
exceedingly complex and technology driven.  The availability of modern surveillance 
systems may result in better situational awareness of military decision makers in the 
execution of orders and conduct of operations.  Command and control (C2) systems 
perform complex computing functions based on the input received from various 
surveillance sensors, including electronic warfare, to give the tactical picture of the 
combat area.  These systems are designed to process information automatically to enable 
quick decision making, thereby allowing more response time for the warfighter on the 
scene. Modern C2 systems are challenged in performing their functions by adversary 
electronic warfare (EW). At the same time, EW is used by friendly forces to ensure that 
C2 systems are able to function robustly and complete necessary missions. Modern 
combat cannot take place ignoring EW capabilities. 
With every passing day, nonmilitary factors are becoming increasingly important 
and militaries of the world will be required to respond to a variety of crises, requiring 
better integration of military actions with the nonmilitary elements of national power.  In 
order to accomplish the diverse range of potential missions effectively and efficiently, 
militaries will heavily depend on their EW assets.  Saudi Arabia is no exception.  
Enhancing the EW capabilities of the RSNF will be a force multiplier. 
A. POLITICAL SITUATION 
The political system in Saudi Arabia is unique and has a tremendous effect on 
decision making at strategic levels. Funding of any new project, therefore, depends upon 
all the intricacies of the political dynamics of the country. Armed forces of the Kingdom 
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are under tremendous pressure to improve due to their increased role and responsibility, 
coupled with the high economic stakes. 
Saudi Arabia is a center of influence in the region. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA) is a major political and economic force in the region. The Kingdom has a huge 
income from its vast oil resources and sponsors the poorer developing Arab nations. 
These factors have helped the Kingdom to increase its influence in the region. 
Furthermore, as the birthplace of Islam, its religious and cultural influence has been 
apparent in the broader Muslim world. Other civilized nations of the world that depend 
upon imported oil, including the United States and China, have a strong relationship with 
the Kingdom. The security of these increased economic interests and influence in the 
region has increased the scope of operation for Royal Saudi Armed Forces. 
The system of government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a monarchy. The 
monarch must be a direct male descendant of the founder, King Abdul Aziz Saudi 
Arabia, under a “Basic Law of Government” decreed by King Fahad in 1992 [1]. This 
law is based on the guidance provided by the Quran and Sunnah.  The declared purpose 
of the Saudi State is the advancement and protection of Islam.  
The King is also the prime minister of the country and has the executive powers 
along with being the head of state. The King is assisted by a Majlis ash Shura 
(Consultative Assembly) for legislation. Despite this unique monarchical political 
structure, the Saudi Arabia Government has always been supportive of the well-being of 
its people. During the multiple “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2010 and 2011, Saudi Arabia 
was not affected seriously.  There were a very few small demonstrations by the minority 
Shia community; however, the country remained stable as a whole. King Abdullah is 
generally popular. In response he announced packages of housing, salary and education 
worth upwards of $100 billion in early 2011 [2].  
The Basic Law provides for the creation of a Consultative Council. People may 
approach “The King’s court” for any complaint or injustice. Every individual has the 
right to address the public authorities in all matters affecting him/her. The government 
seeks opinions from people of various walks of life through a variety of means, such as 
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the Ulema, the council of ministers, the shura, the business community, citizens and the 
armed forces for any decision making in the Kingdom.  
While the King and senior princes maintain the ancient Arabian tradition of the 
majlis‒‒a form of open assembly‒‒in their palaces, to give ordinary citizens the right to 
present petitions or air grievances, popular political participation has always been 
restricted and parties are banned. In October 2003, the government announced plans to 
set up municipal elections with half the seats up for election. The plan was given a 
cautious welcome by the public, but critics of the regime saw it as merely a token  
gesture [3].  
King Abdullah has introduced many reforms, and Saudi society is opening to the 
world.  Joseph A. Kechichian in [4] concludes: 
 In the few years since he acceded to the throne on August 1, 2005, King 
Abdulla bin abdul Aziz has instituted far reaching reforms that, by general 
recognition, altered the face of the kingdom.  Among the significant 
changes that were introduced were: fundamental reforms concerning 
judiciary; launching a national dialogue mechanism that allowed Saudi 
citizens to engage each other in addressing issues that concerned society; 
holding interfaith dialogues that culminated in July 2008 Madrid 
conference; establishing a brand new body to select the monarch and his 
Heir Apparent from among the sons and grandsons of the founder; 
introducing unprecedented bureaucratic transformations to manage the 
religious establishment, including the appointment of a new chairman for 
the Supreme Judicial Council; making changes within the commission for 
the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice; appointing a woman as 
Deputy Education Minister and authorizing the women to serve in the 
Majlis al-Shurah …. who sensed the time was long past for a fundamental 
socio political evolution, in which his own yearnings matched those of his 
subjects. 
B. ECONOMIC SITUATION 
Military budgets are prone to getting cut during times of fiscal crisis. Acquisition 
of new systems, especially sophisticated ones, directly depends upon the prevailing 
economic situation in the country. Saudi Arabia has an oil-based economy with strong 
government controls over major economic activities. It possesses about 17% of the 
world's proven petroleum reserves, ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a 
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leading role in OPEC. The petroleum sector accounts for roughly 80% of budget 
revenues, 45% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings [5]. 
Saudi Arabia is encouraging the growth of the private sector in order to diversify 
its economy and to employ more Saudi nationals. Diversification efforts are focusing on 
power generation, telecommunications, natural gas exploration, and petrochemical 
sectors. Over five million foreign workers play an important role in the Saudi economy, 
particularly in the oil and service sectors, while Riyadh is struggling to reduce 
unemployment among its own nationals. Saudi officials are particularly focused on 
employing its large youth population, which generally lacks the education and technical 
skills the private sector needs. Riyadh has substantially boosted spending on job training 
and education, most recently with the opening of the King Abdallah University of 
Science and Technology‒‒Saudi Arabia's first co-educational university. As part of its 
effort to attract foreign investment, Saudi Arabia acceded to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in December 2005 after many years of negotiations. The 
government has begun establishing six "economic cities" in different regions of the 
country to promote foreign investment and plans to spend $373 billion between 2010 and 
2014 on social development and infrastructure projects to advance Saudi Arabia's 
economic development [5].  
Saudi Arabia’s economic interests are coupled with regional security.  Saudi 
Arabia has 2,640 kilometers of coastline—nearly 1,800 kilometers along the Gulf of 
Aqaba and the Red Sea and the remainder along the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia claims a 
territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and a contiguous zone of 18 nautical miles, as well as 
some small islands, seabed, and subsoils beyond the 12-nautical-mile limit [6]. The 
RSNF has to remain prepared to defend the maritime interests of the nation and to deter 
aggression.  Keeping the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) open is vital for the 
economy due to the export of crude oil and other petroleum products.  All these factors 
demand a high degree of operational readiness for the Royal Saudi Armed Forces and 
especially for the RSNF due to the preponderance of maritime interests.  
 5 
C. REGIONAL SECURITY SITUATION 
Saudi Arabia is an important international stakeholder in issues related to the 
Middle East. Saudi Arabia is thirteenth largest nation in the world by land mass and is 
located in an oil rich region. Saudi Arabia shares its borders with Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Oman, Yemen, Jordan, Qatar and the UAE [5]. The region has been in a virtual state of 
conflict for many decades.  The Iraq–Iran war, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, 
Operations Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom, Iran’s ambitions of becoming a nuclear 
power, Syria’s civil war and the continuing tensions and conflicts with regard to Israel 
are examples of recent and continuing conflicts. Saudi Arabia is a regional power, and 
Saudi economic interests are coupled with regional security.   
Although the Royal Saudi Armed Forces are continually modernized with state-
of-the-art ships, aircraft, artillery, weapons and sensors, the nation remains quite 
vulnerable to conventional attack from regional powers like Iran and Iraq.  Saudi Arabia 
has been the beneficiary of a protective U.S. security umbrella, yet it did not traditionally 
allow U.S. forces inside the Kingdom. However, after the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam 
Hussein, some 500,000 US troops were allowed into the Eastern Province and Northern 
border of Saudi Arabia, along with a smaller number of U.S. military personnel 
elsewhere in the Kingdom. At the Kingdom’s request, these troops were moved to other 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries by the time of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of 
Iraq [7].  
Saudi Arabia has long been a strong advocate of the Palestinian cause and has 
demanded the withdrawal of Israel back behind its 1967 pre-Six Day War borders. Saudi 
Arabia, being a leader of the Muslim world, feels obliged to criticize the U.S. policy 
towards the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict. The Kingdom’s foreign policy makers have 
always faced a challenge in insulating the Kingdom–U.S. relationship from the Palestine–
Israel issue. Despite mostly friendly long-term relations with the U.S., Saudi Arabia feels 
threatened by Israel’s regional stance and possible aspirations. Saudi Arabia has a 
traditional rivalry with Iran due to her hegemonic regional designs and Shiite identity. 
Figure 1 offers a map of Saudi Arabia showing all the regional security players. 
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Figure 1.  Saudi Arabia map (from Google Maps). 
In recent times the fundamental shift from war fighting to war prevention, the 
shift to conducting military operations short of war or military operations other than war, 
the growing asymmetric nature of conflict, and the ever changing regional security 
conditions have created a greater demand for acquisition of EW resources. EW 
equipment can help to prevent the situation from escalating beyond desired levels by 
providing a comprehensive and timely awareness of situations, so that politicians and 
commanders can determine appropriate reactions and implement them while the situation 
is still manageable. This can only be realized with the help of a very powerful 
infrastructure of electronic warfare facilities, command and control centers, 
communication links, computers and displays. This theme is also validated by U.S. Army 
EW doctrine FM 3-36 [8]: 
Commanders employ and integrate their unit’s capabilities and actions 
within their operational environment to achieve a desired end state. 
Through analyzing their operational environment, commanders understand 
how the results of friendly, adversary, and neutral actions may impact that 
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end state. During military operations, both friendly and enemy 
commanders depend on the flow of information to make informed 
decisions. This flow of information depends on the electronic systems and 
devices used to communicate, navigate, sense, store, and process 
information. 
D. THE KINGDOM’S ROLE IN THE REGION 
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is based on its need to maintain the market for 
petroleum products and its role as the guardian of Islam’s two holiest places located 
within its borders, Mecca and Medina.  Saudi Arabia’s policies play a central role in the 
policy making of the GCC and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC).  Saudi Arabia has been a leader in the formation of the World Muslim League 
(WML) and the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). The OIC has its secretariat 
within the Kingdom in Jeddah and is represented by 57 Muslim states. Its purpose is to 
“strengthen solidarity and cooperation among member states” [9].  
Saudi Arabia also enjoys strong relations with world powers like the U.S.., Japan 
and China. Saudi Arabia has been struggling to diversify its petroleum market and extend 
its influence beyond the GCC. Saudi Arabia has managed to diversify its trade and hence 
its influence. Currently, Japan, China, the U.S., the Republic of Korea, India and 
Singapore are leading importers of Saudi products. Although Saudi Arabia has been a 
long-term ally of the U.S. in the region and will likely continue to be so in the foreseeable 
future, it also maintains very good relations with emerging powers like China and India. 
Today, oil supplies about 40% of the world’s energy and 95% of its transportation 
energy. As a result, those who own the lion’s share of the reserves of this precious energy 
source are in the driver’s seat of the world economy, and their influence is steadily 
growing. Since the 1930s the Middle East has emerged as the world’s most important 
source of energy and the key to the stability of the global economy. This region produces 
37% of the world’s oil and 18% of its gas [10]. Because of the world’s dependence on 
imported oil, Saudi Arabia will continue to be a relevant player in regional and world 
security in the years to come.  
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E. RSNF FORCE STRUCTURE 
All Saudi conventional forces are organized under the Ministry of Defence and 
Aviation (MODA) to defend the Kingdom against any external aggression. The RSNF is 
an operational force of MODA. Another force, the Saudi Arabian National Guard, is 
responsible for maintaining the internal stability of the Kingdom. 
The Royal Saudi Naval Forces, sometimes also referred to as the Royal Saudi 
Navy (RSN), has its main headquarters located in Riyadh. It has four major branches:  
Administration, Operations, Intelligence, and Logistics, similar to those of the Army and 
Air Force. The RSNF is further divided operationally into the western fleet with 
headquarters at Jeddah on the Red Sea and the eastern fleet with headquarters at Al-
Jubayl on the Arabian Gulf. The Marine regiment is organized as an infantry regiment 
and has a separate command. The Arabian Gulf Division has bases at Dammam, Ras-
Tanura, and Al-Qatif, plus a naval aviation element. The Red Sea Division has bases at 
Haql, Al Wajh, and Yanbu [11].  
The RSNF sought guidance from the verse of The Holy Qur’an in setting up its 
mission, 
 
{ كلفلا ىرتو اهنوسبلت هيلح   هنم اوجرختستو ً ايرط ًامحل هنم اولكأتل رحبلا رخس يذلا وهو
نوركشت مكلعلو هلضف نم اوغتبتل هيف رخاوم}  
 
"And He Who has subjected to you the sea that you may eat there from fresh flesh and 
may take forth ornaments which you wear. And thou see the ships ploughing through it, 
that you may seek His bounty and that you may be grateful." 
What distinguishes the naval forces from other branches of the armed forces is its 
ability to exist and diffuse in forward locations far from the regional borders of the state. 
This forward deployment is a historical and constant objective of naval forces. Naval 
forces perform many missions that contribute to attaining national security in its broad 
concept. Missions may include deterrence of attacks, promotion of regional stability and 
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readiness for quick responses to any developing crisis at the right time. The RSNF 
mission is also derived from these guiding principles and is reproduced here: 
Saudi naval forces play economic Facilities Protection tasks at sea and the 
protection of commercial, military, and civil convoys and securing the 
country's exports and imports in addition to assist civil authorities in 
evacuation and rescue operations during disasters and crises. [12] 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into four chapters including this chapter. 
Chapter I: Introduction. This chapter gives general information regarding the 
political, economic situation in Saudi Arabia, the impact of ongoing turmoil in the region 
on stability, Saudi Arabia’s role in the region, the RSNF current force structure and its 
mission. 
Chapter II: Literature Review. This chapter will provide a review of the EW 
environment, technologies, definitions and current trends. 
Chapter III: Technical Aspects of EW. This chapter describes the technical 
aspects of EW, the inter-relationships of various EW elements in a broader perspective 
and derivation of radar, jamming and POI equations. 
Chapter IV: Capability Gap Analysis.  This chapter will analyze the current EW 
capabilities of the Kingdom, will provide an analysis of threats against the Kingdom, and 
will discuss what EW upgrades that are needed to neutralize the threats effectively.    
Chapter V: Current Technological Trends. This chapter will conclude the 
argument and set some recommendations for decision makers based on the findings. 
Areas requiring further research will also be highlighted.  Budgetary issues, if any, will 
also be discussed to assist leadership in decision making. 
Chapter VI: Summary and Conclusion. This chapter will summarize the argument 
and conclude the thesis. 
 10 
G. OBJECTIVES 
The purpose or this research is to analyze the security environment in the region 
and the local political situation, research modern trends in EW technologies, examine the 
RSNF capability gaps, analyze budgetary conditions and recommend a way forward with 
an acquisition strategy to fill the gaps. This research shall help RSNF decision makers to 
acquire EW sensors and integrated systems which will improve situational awareness and 
thus shorten the decision making cycle in a high tempo operational environment. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Victory in the combat zone depends on the degree of real-time knowledge 
available regarding the enemy’s movements and/or intended actions.  This knowledge is 
gathered during peace time as well as with real-time intelligence gathered during 
hostilities using various electronic sensors. This knowledge is necessary for commanders 
to plan operations and exercise control during various stages of the conflict. Real-time 
knowledge also helps commanders to update and modify plans continuously and issue 
orders to execute different contingencies based on the combat situation. In all such 
situations, EW systems play the role of the eyes and ears of the commander. Efficacy of 
EW systems in the combat zone is now a proven fact. During the Gulf War of 1991, 
strike aircraft were normally not permitted to conduct air operations unless protected by 
enemy air defense suppression aircraft such as the EA-6B and EF-111. These aircraft 
were equipped with transmitters to disrupt or “jam” radar equipment used by enemy 
surface-to-air missiles or antiaircraft artillery systems [13].  
Today forces have been exposed to the versatile aspects of the modern operational 
environment. Electronic warfare systems support is vital to operational effectiveness in a 
hostile electronic environment.  Militaries are, therefore, forced to acquire EW systems in 
order to prepare for the challenges of the modern battlefield. 
A. EW ENVIRONMENT 
Electronic systems form the brain of many weapons and sensors employed in 
modern warfare. These systems provide information to firing platforms regarding target 
detection, tracking, designation, fire control solution, navigation and motion control for 
kinetic weapons.  Communication and other information networks also consist of 
electronic systems. The effective use or denial of use of these electronics can contribute 
decisively to the outcome of any conflict.  Efficacy of electronic warfare systems will, 
therefore, remain a relevant discussion topic in any operational context. The operational 
environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect 
the employment of EW capabilities and on the decisions of the commander [14]. 
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As mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia shares its borders with Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Oman, Yemen, Jordan, Qatar and the UAE [5].  The region has been in a state of conflict 
for many decades.  The Iraq–Iran war, Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, Operations Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, Iranian ambitions of 
becoming a nuclear power, and Syria’s civil war are examples of recent or on-going 
conflicts. Saudi Arabia is a regional power and has her economic interests coupled with 
regional security.  The current security environment demands a higher degree of 
readiness than is currently the case.  
In addition to these territorial borders, Saudi Arabia has a long coastline to defend 
from any aggression.  Keeping the sea lines of communication open is vital for the 
country’s economy due to the high volume of export activity involving crude oil and 
other petroleum products.  A well-equipped RSNF in itself will be a stabilizing factor in 
the region. EW capabilities and technologies will help RSNF in this regard and assist 
RSNF in preventing situations or potential crises from escalating beyond manageable 
levels as well as provide a comprehensive and timely awareness of situations. This 
information will enable politicians and commanders to determine appropriate reactions 
and implement them while the situation is still current. This capability requires a 
developed infrastructure of electronic warfare facilities, command and control centers, 
communication links, computers and displays.  
B. EW BENEFITS 
Electronic warfare can be portrayed as electronic combat, which includes 
operational philosophy, strategy, and doctrine. EW technologies make use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which includes radio and radar, infrared, optical, and 
ultraviolet frequencies, to gain control of the EM environment and deny the enemy the 
capacity to use it to his advantage. The benefit of electronic warfare must ultimately be 
expressed in terms of combat mission success, such as gaining more intelligence without 
detection, servicing more targets, improving protection of the nation’s own forces, 
securing EW environment dominance, generating more combat missions for a given force 
size, and providing more effective combat management. Because electronic warfare 
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capabilities have a significant price tag, EW must demonstrate a greater benefit than 
would be provided by a larger force without EW at the same total cost. 
As highlighted earlier, superior and effective use of the EMS has become vital for 
the success of any military operation within the context of modern warfare. EW 
capabilities are not only necessary for offensive operations but have become a mandatory 
requirement for the effective defense of a nation’s own assets. Most notably, missile and 
improvised explosive device (IED) threats can be countered by suitably employing 
electronic warfare technologies, such as jamming systems, anti-radiation missiles and 
electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems. 
C. EW CLASSIFICATION 
Electronic warfare is defined as military action involving the use of 
electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack 
the enemy. As illustrated in Figure 2, electronic warfare consists of three divisions: 
electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support [15].  
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Figure 2.  EW classification. (From [15]). 
 
D. PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES AND KEY TERMS RELATED TO EW 
EW is an important capability that can advance desired military, diplomatic, and 
economic objectives or, conversely, impede undesirable ones. In a military application, 
EW provides the means to counter, in all battle phases, hostile actions that involve the 
electromagnetic (EM) spectrum- from the beginning when enemy forces are mobilized 
for an attack, through to the final engagement [16]. 
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The key terms and principal activities of EW are summarized briefly in the 
following subsections. All of the information regarding the following activities and terms 
have been retrieved from [15], unless otherwise cited.  
1. Electromagnetic Compatibility 
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) is the ability of systems, equipment, and 
devices that utilize the electromagnetic spectrum to operate in their intended operational 
environment (OE) without suffering unacceptable degradation or causing unintentional 
degradation because of EM radiation or response. 
2. Electromagnetic Deception 
EM deception is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, suppression, 
absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to 
convey misleading information to an enemy or to enemy EM-dependent weapons, 
thereby degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability. 
3. Electromagnetic Hardening 
EM hardening consists of actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and 
equipment by filtering, attenuating, grounding, bonding, blanking, and shielding against 
the undesirable effects of EM energy. EM hardening is an electronic protection (EP) 
activity. 
4. Electronic Masking 
Electronic masking is the controlled radiation of EM energy on friendly 
frequencies in a manner to protect the emissions of friendly communications and 
electronic systems against enemy ES measures/signal intelligence (SIGINT) without 
significantly degrading the operation of friendly systems. 
5. SIGINT  
The distinction between ES and SIGINT is delineated by purpose, scope, and 
context. ES assets are tasked by operational commanders to search for, intercept, identify, 
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and locate or localize sources of intentional or unintentional radiated EM energy. In 
contrast, SIGINT assets are tasked by the Director, National Security Agency 
(NSA)/Chief, Central Security Service (CSS) or understanding or temporary SIGINT 
operational tasking authority by an operational commander. 
6. ESM or ES  
According to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the Electronic 
Support Measure (ESM) or Electronic Support (ES) is “that division of EW involving 
actions taken to search for, intercept, locate, record, and analyze radiated electromagnetic 
energy for the purpose of exploiting such radiations in support of military operations . . .. 
Thus, ESM provides a source of information required to conduct electronic 
countermeasures (ECM) or Electronic Protection Measures (EPM), electronic counter-
counter measures (ECCM) or Electronic Attack (EA), threat detection, warning, 
avoidance, target acquisition, and homing” [17].  
7. ECM or EA 
Tactical or strategic operational methods of using electronic technologies to 
deceive, disrupt, jam or negate the effectiveness of opposing electronic systems and 
techniques is called ECM/EA [18].  
8. ECCM OR EPM 
Ways to defeat an enemy’s ECM against own electronic systems and actions 
taken to ensure our own effective use of electromagnetic radiations [18]. 
9. Jamming  
EM jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of EM energy 
for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use of the EMS, and with 
the intent of degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability.  
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10. Look-Through  
This is a technique used during jamming or being jammed to monitor the 
jamming emission or victim signal. It causes irregular interruption for extremely short 
periods of time. When being jammed, the technique allows for observing or monitoring 
of a signal during interruptions in the jamming signal [19]. 
E. EW TECHNIQUES 
EW technology is progressing rapidly due to the increased reliance on electronic 
sensors. EM energy offers unlimited opportunities and vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited for military operations. Although new equipment and new tactics will continue 
to be developed, the physical characteristics of EM energy will never change. Therefore, 
basic activities of EW will remain more or less the same despite variation in hardware 
and tactics [15].  
Much of this technology is highly classified. However, there are generally known 
techniques that can be employed to make effective use of the EMS. The information 
below is extracted from relevant chapters of the Royal Navy’s ‘EW Principles’ Student 
Study Guide taught at Royal Navy Maritime Warfare School, HMS Collingwood [20] 
unless otherwise specified. Various techniques used for ESM, ECM and ECCM are listed 
below. While the terms ESM, ECM, and ECCM are no longer addressed within U.S. joint 
doctrine and publications, the terminology is still common within industry and with other 
nations. ESM can be loosely translated as electronic warfare support (ES), ECM as 
electronic attack (EA), and ECCM as electronic protection (EP). 
1. ESM   
The basic role of ESM receivers is to detect, classify and report the presence of 
any electronic signal within a designed frequency band. Some of the techniques used for 
direction finding (DF) and frequency measurement are appended below:  
a. Amplitude comparison technique (8 port digital) 
b.  Phase comparison technique (multi linear phase array) 
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c. Time of arrival DF in conjunction with other sensors like GPS  
d. Use of Multi Delay Line Instantaneous Frequency Measurement Receiver 
2. ECM   
All ECM activities are aimed at negating the effective use of the EMS by the 
enemy electronic systems.  Frequently used mature techniques are as follows: 
 Passive ECM Techniques 
 Passive techniques include the use of chaff and reflective decoys to 
confuse radars and avoidance detection by employing stealth technology features in 
system design or by following a flight profile outside the vertical coverage diagram 
(VCD) of the radar (e.g., low level). 
 Active ECM Techniques 
 ECM active techniques may include noise jammers, transponder 
jammers, false target generators, electronic decoys, Range Gate Pull-Off (RGPO), Angle 
Gate Pull-Off (AGPO), Velocity Gate Pull-Off (VGPO), home on jam (HOJ) missiles 
and anti-radiation missiles (ARMs).  
3. ECCM OR EPM  
ECCM is that subdivision of EW in which measures are taken to defeat an 
enemy's ECM effort against own electronic warfare systems and actions taken to ensure 
own effective use of electromagnetic radiations. Some of the techniques used are as 
follows. 
 Antenna Features 
 There are number of techniques which can be employed by radar 
antenna to minimize enemy ECM effort. These antenna techniques include polarization 
agility, lobe on receiver only (LORO), multiple lobing rate, track on jam (TOJ), side lobe 
blanking, side lobe suppression/cancellation and higher antenna gain. 
 19 
 When a non-coherent jammer transmits, only that part of the signal 
which is correctly polarized enters the radar receiver. Very little jamming signal will 
enter the receiver if radar has its plane of polarization orthogonal with respect to the 
jammer. 
 Lobing rate information can be denied to amplitude modulation 
jammers and inverse gain jammers if radar transmits a common beam and only uses 
multiple beams for the receiver. Some amplitude modulation jammers succeed in causing 
tracking radar break lock by sweeping very slowly (less than the actual lobing rate). 
 Angle tracking systems can detect any oscillations caused by 
amplitude modulation jammers. The radar lobing rate can be altered to damp the 
oscillation out. This technique is called multiple lobing rate.  
 In the case when a radar operator feels that radar is being jammed 
by a self-protection jammer, he can switch off the transmitter and angle track the jammer 
through the jamming signal being transmitted by the jammer. This technique is called 
track on jam. 
 Noise and clutter signals can enter the radar receiver through the 
side lobes and display as if they are present in the main lobe.  Stand off or support 
jammers take advantage of this fact. In order to cancel the returns received through side 
lobes, an active side lobe cancellation circuit is used [21]. 
 Transmitter Features 
 Electronic protection or ECCM techniques for transmitters 
includes frequency agility, frequency diversity, burn through range and PRF jittering. 
 Frequency agility is a technique used by radar transmitters where 
radar can change its frequency by at least twice per pulse. Random frequency agility will 
render spot jamming and sweep jamming ineffective forcing the jammer to operate in 
barrage mode which requires tremendous power to be effective.  Frequency agility also 
helps to increase the maximum effective range of the radar and remove range ambiguities 
for Low PRF systems. 
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 Frequency diversity is another technique where radar can quickly 
change band to render spot, sweep or barrage jamming ineffective. As most of the 
transmitter components are frequency or wavelength specific, the amount of frequency 
diversity is normally very limited. 
 Burn through range is the distance beyond which a self-protection 
jammer cannot obscure the target due to higher skin returns than the jamming signal. 
Burn through range can be achieved by increasing the radar power output while the 
antenna is pointing at the jammer.  The concept of burn through range is covered in more 
detail in section C of the next chapter [21]. 
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III. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF EW 
Modern warfare systems such as radars, communication sets, weapon control and 
guidance systems and displays are comprised of electronic components. Each system has 
unique electronic characteristics vulnerable to electronic attacks. EW, therefore, is aimed 
at negating or at least reducing the effectiveness of enemy systems and assisting one’s 
own forces in positive identification of friendly assets and enemy assets. Both of these 
tasks are accomplished primarily by manipulating various technical characteristics of the 
electronic components, which in turn are basic building blocks of the larger military 
systems such as radars, communication equipment, jammers, radios, actuators, data 
processing assemblies or guidance and control circuits.  This chapter covers the technical 
aspects of these major electronic warfare systems. 
A. RADAR 
Radar stands for RAdio Detection and Ranging. The basic purpose of radar 
includes target detection, determination of the target’s range, bearing, elevation, velocity 
and identification of target type and purpose. Radars normally operate in the upper half of 
the radio spectrum (> 1 MHz). The portion of the electromagnetic spectrum used for 












 Laser Radar 




Figure 3.  The portion of the EM spectrum used for radar. (From [20]). 
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Radar can be classified as primary or secondary radar based on transmitted signal 
and received signal. The main types of primary radar include continuous wave (CW), 
pulse modulated and frequency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) radars. CW radar 
applications in a naval environment are limited to Doppler navigation, ship docking, 
weapon fusing, and target illumination. Pulse modulated radars have variety of naval 
operational uses such as long-range early warning, surveillance, target indication, 
tracking/fire control and navigation. FMCW radars are used in some missile fire control 
systems and as a method of reducing detection by using very low power signals for 
navigation radars [22]. 
B. RADAR RANGE EQUATION 
The electronic principle on which radar operates is very similar to the principle of 
sound-wave reflection. Radar uses electromagnetic energy pulses to detect, track and 
identify a target. The EM energy is transmitted to and reflected from the target object. A 
small portion of the reflected energy (echo) returns to the radar set. Radar sets use the 
echo to determine the direction and distance of the reflecting object based on the speed of 
EM energy and the time required for an echo to return. Modern radar can extract widely 
more information from a target's echo signal than its range. But the calculation of the 
range is one of its most important functions. 
The radar range equation provides a theoretical means of calculating the 
maximum range of a radar. If a radar transmits a power TP  from an isotopic (omni-
directional) antenna, then the power per unit area (or power density) at a distance R  from 
the transmitting aerial is equal to the transmitted power divided by the surface area of a 
sphere of radius R  is,  





    (1) 
Radar sets use a directional antenna to focus the transmitted power in a particular 
direction.  The directional gain, G, of an antenna is defined as: 
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 G = 
Maximum power per unit solid angle directional aerial
Power per unit solid angle isotropic aerial with same power input
  
If the antenna produces a beam of solid angle  then G can be redefined as: 















Applying the antenna gain to the power density gives the power density at 













At the distance R , a target will reflect a proportion of the incident energy.  The 
amount of power reflected will depend on the incident power density and the effective 
radar cross sectional area of the target denoted by  . The power reflected by the target 
is: 







  (4) 
 
This power is re-radiated in all directions; thus the returning power density at the 
radar aerial is the reflected power divided by
24 R . Power density at the receiving 
antenna 
 













The amount of power gathered by the receiving antenna RP , is given by the 
received power density multiplied by the effective aperture area of the receiving antenna 













The half power beamwidth of an antenna is defined approximately by 
 




   
  (7) 
  
where  is the wavelength and D  is the diameter of antenna aperture. This can be 
applied separately to the vertical and horizontal planes.  In the case where they are all 
equal, the effective solid angle into which the power of the antenna lobe is directed is 
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Compared to the solid angle of 4  steradians  into which a non-directional 
isotropic antenna radiates its power, the above equation represents a concentration of 
power, i.e. gain, which is equal to the ratio of the solid angles. 
 
Substituting (8) into (2) gives 
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The gain of a practical antenna is less than the ideal value given in (10) and can 
be rewritten as 







   (11) 
where  is the antenna efficiency. Therefore 
    
eA A  
   (12) 
and 
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If the same antenna is used for transmission and reception Equations (6) and (13) 
can be combined to give 
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3 4
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The maximum range of the radar maxR  is achieved when the power input to the 
receiver RP , has dropped to the lowest level which the receiver is capable of detecting.  
This is known as the Minimum Detectable Signal,  minS  








   (15) 
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Re-arranging to give an expression for Rmax 
    12 2 4
max 3









  (16) 
 
Finally, we must take into account any losses. Let sL = t r aL L L  be the system loss 
factor due to losses which are present in the system or in its operating environment. tL
and rL  are the losses on the transmit and receive sides, respectively. aL is the atmospheric 
loss.  Then [22] 
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max 3
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The radar equation is a good source to analyze the tradeoffs in order to improve 
detection performance.  If we look at each part of the radar equation, we can control 
certain parameters.  Increasing the peak transmitter power, the gain of the transmitting 
antenna and the area of the receiving antenna and reducing the acceptable minimum 
detectable signal all increase the maximum detection range.  However, this is the basic 
radar equation.  Many other factors like detection performance and signal-to-noise ratio 
(SNR) have not been considered.   
We know that thermal noise power in a bandwidth nB  is  
     
s nN kT B  
   (18) 
 
where 
sT  = Total System Noise Temperature 
nB  = Noise bandwidth of the receiver 
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k  = Boltzmann’s constant (
231.38 10  [J K-1]) 
To consider noise in this equation, we divide the left side by N and the right side 
by s nkT B . The SNR is 
 










   (19) 
 
A processing gain factor pG  has been included in the numerator. 
In order to get radar information for all bearings, it is necessary to rotate the 
antenna beam continuously.  To be sure of getting an echo from a target, it is necessary to 
ensure that the beam sweeps at a required rate.  For most radar applications, it is an 
advantage to have as many pulse hits per sweep as possible within the constraints of 
scanning at a reasonable rate. The returns from multiple targets can be integrated, which 
provide a processing gain. If the number of hits per scan is n  then 
 
    
( )pG nE n  
   (20) 
 
where: 
    n   = Number of hits (pulses) per second 
 ( )E n = Integration efficiency ( 0 1iE  )  
Thus if a series of returns is added together the echo power will add, whereas the 
noise power will not.  This gives rise to an improvement in SNR and thus detection 
range.  In some systems, losses in the processing circuitry and the use of non-coherent 
integration make the improvement factor somewhat lower than the maximum value n  
that can be achieved. 
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The final form of the radar range equation considering integration efficiency can 
be represented as [20] 




(4 ) s s
S PG n n
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C. EW RADAR JAMMING EQUATION 
ECM can be either jamming or deception.  The objective of ECM is to reduce or 
suppress the effectiveness of enemy defense systems and their relevant weapons systems 
through soft kill actions such as confusion, distraction, deception or seduction [22]. 
Active ECM is commonly called jamming, and the calculations of ECM signal in the 
radar compared to the target signal in the radar commonly refer to the jamming-to-signal 
ratio (JSR). The term jamming refers to any ECM transmission, whether deception or 
concealment. Concealment is normally called noise or noise jamming. 
Active ECM or jamming against hostile radars may be employed for self-
protection or in support of any friendly unit. Support or escort ECM is usually through 
noise jamming. The SNR at the output of the radar receiver is represented by 
Equation(21). 
Then maximum target detection range from the radar is 
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where min(S/N) is the minimum signal to noise power ratio for detection. 
The jammer power in the radar receiver, spread over a band width jB  (usually 
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where 
jP  = transmitted jammer power 
jG  = jammer antenna gain 
rJG = radar antenna gain in the direction of the jammer 
jR  = distance of the jammer from the radar  
jL  = jammer transmission loss 
 
The jamming equation for a self-protection jammer and a support/escort jammer 
can be derived separately. 
1. Self-protection jammer 
For a self-protection jammer, R  = jR   and rjG = tG = rG . Hence, the effective 
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It can be deduced that more jammer power will be required to achieve self-
screening range for targets of higher RCS. 
2. Mutual protection jammer 
For a mutual protection jammer, rj SLLG G .  By assuming that r tG G , the burn 
through range (BTR) of the jammer maxt jR can be given by 
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The ratio ρ of the detection range in jamming conditions with respect to clear 
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This shows that   is increasing with short wavelengths, low side lobe level 
(SLL) and high radar processing gain. Hence a compromise has to be made between the 
ERP of the jammer and the frequency for various jamming roles. 
 31 
D. INTERCEPT RECEIVER 
One of the most important tasks of EW is to detect the signal from an unknown 
transmitter and analyze its parameters, such as frequency, angle of arival (AOA), pulse 
width and amplitude and pulse repetition frequency for identification purposes. This task 
is normally carried out by intercept receivers, and the information collected is referred to 
as ELINT.  
In order to detect any incoming signal by an intercept receiver would require an 
infinite bandwidth which is not possible in reality. Therefore, ESM suites and radar 
warning receivers (RWRs) consist of number of receivers with small bandwidths to 
enhance the probability of detection or probability of intercept (POI). Several directional 
antennas are used to increase the sensitivity of the receiver and enhance receiver ability to 
measure AOA more accurately. 
Intercept receivers require high sensitivity, high dyanmic range and wider 
bandwidth. Intercept receiver characteristics are related to its functions of interception, 
recognition and measurement. Intercept system parameters can be capitilized to enhance 
performance of a specific function at the cost of compromising another one.  If we want 
to design an intercept receiver with high probability of intercept then we will be 
compromising on the measurement function. To increase the POI, the bandwidth needs to 
be wide, hence compromising the accuracy of the measurement. Major characteristics of 
an inercept receiver include POI, sensitivity, dynamic range, coverage band, analysis 
bandwidth, unusual environment performance, dense environment performance, single 
pulse performance, multiple simultaneous signal performance and processor/signal sorter 
requirement [23]. 



















cwP = CW power of the emitter 
tG  = Emitter antenna gian 
rG  = Intercept receiver gain 
and 
  I o I I IS kT F B SNR  
 (30) 
 
is the sensitivity. The receiver has a noise figure of IF , a bandwidth IB , and ISNR  is the 
SNR  at the receiver input. oT  = 290
0
 K is the standard temperature. If the emitter is 
within the maximum intercept range, then an intercept is possible. The POI is discussed 
next. 
E. PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT 
The POI is a measure of the chance of picking up an unknown signal within range 
of the receiver [21]. POI is a key performance feature of EW surveillance and 
reconnaissance systems. It relates to the probability of two or more parametric “window 
functions” such as scanning antennas, sweeping or stepping receivers and frequency agile 
emitters [23]. 
EW systems have to deal with increasing complexity and density of the 
electromagnetic environment, multi-mode emitters, high and low ERPs, increased signal 
agilities, complex scan and fleeting emissions. Low probability of intercept (LPI) 
emitters have emerged as a critical POI issue due to the asymmetric nature of threats. EW 
receiving systems, therefore, have become EW suites which provide situational 
awareness, protection and ELINT capabilities. EW system designers are being pushed 
more and more towards architectures that deliver single pulse or pulse burst capabilities 
[23]. 
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The non-cooperative intercept receiver (NCIR) analysis is similar to the radar 
received power calculation, but with unpredictable transmitter properties. In other words, 
the optimum parameters for intercepting and detecting the transmitter signal may not be 
known. 
The POI of a single pulse for a frequency scanning receiver such as a 








POI = POI (single pulse) 
  = Receiver Intermediate Frequency (IF) bandwidth 
D  = Total receiver frequency scanning rate 
The POI of “wide open” receivers such as the crystal video receiver (CV Rx) for a 
single pulse is 100% [21]. 
F. A CLASSIC EW SCENARIO 
Figure 4 illustrates a classic EW scenerio that shows the interaction of mulitiple 
EW components. The radar is an emitter that can be detected by the intercept receiver, 
which then gives the data to the aircraft that can launch a missile. The aircraft is equipped 
with a jammer that can degrade the radar’s performance and impede the detection, 
tracking and targeting of the missile. The system parameters determine the various 
detection and burn through ranges. The system specifications are crucial in how an EW 
network will perform. 
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Figure 4.  Classic EW scenario. 
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IV. CAPABILITY GAP ANALYSIS 
This EW capabilities gap analysis is based on the understanding of expected war 
fighting functions of the armed forces of Saudi Arabia and the capabilities required to 
address potential enemy EW threats within the joint operational environment. This gap 
analysis can also guide selection of improved EW platforms and systems, and integration 
of new systems with existing legacy systems. 
The first logical step is to identify the needed effects from EW functions and how 
these functions can be employed most effectively.  In today’s era of technology, EW 
capabilities can be applied from air, sea, land and space.  The major consideration again 
will be generation of desired effects involving various levels of detection, denial, 
deception, disruption, degradation, protection and destruction and the EW system 
carrying platforms.  A variety of other factors like own and enemy electronic order of 
battle (EOB), operational concepts, equipment employed and users of the equipment 
remain relevant. All factors combined can be referred to as the Electromagnetic 




Figure 5.  Electromagnetic Environment. 
A. STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 
The strategic priority for the RSNF has been keeping the SLOCs open through the 
Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. These locations are vital for oil exports. All 
planning in any military is carried out in accordance with the commander’s concept of 
operation, higher political level directives and grand, national military strategy.  
Based upon strategic priorities and grand strategy the RSNF is organized on the 
“fleet in being” strategy. This strategy seems a good choice for the RSNF based on its 
fleet size and capability.  
The “fleet in being” strategy employs the avoidance of direct confrontation with a 
superior enemy and focuses on preserving its own maritime assets.  In short, the concept 
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of “fleet in being” is where one tries to remain viable until the end of hostilities and 
therefore continues to pose a threat to an adversary by interdicting targets of opportunity.  
In the twentieth century, the most obvious example of the conduct of a “fleet in being” 
strategy was that adopted by Germany through most of the First World War when, by 
keeping their major surface combatants away from decisive battle, they kept the British 
fleet tied down [25]. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not have any offensive plans against any 
neighbor or regional state.  Therefore, the entire force structure of the kingdom is based 
on its defensive needs and regional policing requirements. 
B. OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The conduct of maritime operations has undergone transformation with changes 
in the geo-strategic and political environment worldwide.  The end of the Cold War and 
consequent mitigation of threats of general and limited wars have shifted the focus of the 
navies away from the military role; the benign/constabulary tasks are becoming more 
predominant.  In this changing environment, the RSNF is no exception.  The Coalition 
Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP) and Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) are 
manifestations of these new challenges.  
The CMCP is a coalition force consisting of ships from major navies of the world. 
This coalition force is working to prevent terrorist attacks against vital maritime 
infrastructures in the Gulf region. International terrorist organizations pose a real threat to 
critical maritime infrastructures in the region, including the oil and shipping industries.  
Another important responsibility of the CMCP is to check and interrupt the trafficking of 
drugs, arms and humans. Similarly, CTF 150 is a multinational coalition naval task force 
having its headquarters in Bahrain. The task force’s mission is to monitor, inspect, board 
and stop suspect shipping. All of these operations fall under the umbrella of Maritime 
Security Operations (MSO). 
The primary mission of the RSNF during peace time will be performed in either a 
constabulary or a benign role. These roles are derived from the RSNF mission statement, 
which states that “Saudi naval forces play economic Facilities Protection tasks at sea and 
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in the protection of commercial, military, and civil convoys and securing the country's 
exports and imports in addition to assisting civil authorities in evacuation and rescue 
operations during disasters and crises” (Commodore Ali Alshehri, personnel 
communication, 2013). It can also be deduced that the RSNF will be employed in a self-
defense posture in case of war. 
C. CURRENT RSNF EW CAPABILITY 
Three Al Riyadh (F3000S) class multipurpose anti-air warfare stealth frigates 
serve as the mainstay of the RSNF. These ships were built by DCNS of France.  Al 
Riyadh class ships have some additional anti-air warfare and anti-submarine capability as 
compared to the French La Fayette class frigate upon which they are loosely based. The 
onboard electronic warfare suite includes the DR 3000 for ESM, the Altesse 
communications intercept system, the Salamandre B2 radar jammer, TRC 281 
communications jammer and two Sagem Défense Sécurité Dagaie decoy launchers [26]. 
The Altesse integrates direction finding, analysis and interception functions to minimize 
processing time. The Altesse can operate in either the automatic scan, recurrent 
surveillance or fixed frequency mode [27].  The RSNF also operates Dauphin helicopters 
having ASE(2) electronic warfare suites onboard.  
Saudi Arabia is in the process of establishing a national-level command, control, 
communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) system. Raytheon Network Centric 
Systems was awarded a $600M contract in 2012 to develop and deploy this system for 
the Kingdom. This modern C4I system is expected to link to the Kingdom’s ground radar 
network. Moreover, the system will help to fuse information from advanced Royal Saudi 
Air Force (RSAF) surveillance assets, such as the E-3/RE-3 and Saab Erieye turboprop 
air borne early warning and control (AEW&C), to compile the tactical picture in real time 
jointly.  The RSAF can effectively use all this information to command their advanced 
fighter fleets of F-15s, Eurofighters, and Tornados effectively [28].  Integration of naval 
EW assets in this overall C4I system is a priority operational requirement and is being 
handled accordingly. 
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D. ONGOING PROJECTS  
As highlighted earlier, RSNF is undergoing an upgrade. This upgrade involves the 
acquisition of new platforms as well as modern weapons and systems. The ongoing 
projects that will directly affect EW capability are summarized below. 
1. C4I 
The Saudi Navy C4I system is unable to support effective modern combat 
operations on its own. This fact was realized practically when the Gulf War began. As a 
result, the Saudi Navy purchased a $307 million upgrade of its C4I system on September 
27, 1990 [29].  Since that time, the Saudi Navy C4I has been upgraded significantly.  It 
now has Link 16 secure communications capability, and its C4I/BM links are fully 
compatible with those of the U.S. Navy. RSNF manpower overall training proficiency 
and readiness have also been augmented to support complex combat operations. (Saudi 
Arabia Enters the 21st Century [30]. 
The RSNF C3 upgrade was a public project and proposals were solicited on the 
U.S. government procurement website Fed Biz Opps in 2003 [31]. 
In fact, the RSNF C4I system is a segment of the national level C4I system (The 
Peace Shield) managed by RSAF. The Peace Shield system links the networks of the 
Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF), RSNF and Royal Saudi Air Defense Force (RSADF). 
The Peace Shield program provides a nationwide ground-air defense and command, 
control and communications system to the RSAF. The Peace Shield mainly consists of 17 
radars, a central command operations center, five sector command and operations centers, 
nationwide communications links, interfaces with all agencies having a role in national 
defense and communications centers to contact and control civil and military aircraft.  
The central command operation center is in Riyadh, while sector command and 
operations centers are located in Dhahran, Taif, Tabuk, Khamis Mushait and AI Kharj. 
The system includes 164 sites and more than 1,600 communications circuits [32]. 
Peace Shield integrates all long-range radar, remote-controlled air and ground 
radio communications sites and the associated telecommunications network. Data from 
the long-range 3D radars and tactical radars is fed into the Peace Shield. This system can 
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exchange data with airborne warning and control system (AWACS) ground entry 
stations, ECM-resistant ground-based 3D radars, integrated air defense missile systems, 
satellite communications (SATCOM), RSAF headquarters, air traffic/early warning radar 
sites located throughout the Kingdom and the radars of the RSNF. Peace Shield employs 
a secure high-speed broadband Wide-Area Network (WAN) to support the increased data 
exchange requirements of the entire C4I System. A High-Speed Network (HSN) is the 
communications backbone of the Peace Shield [33]. 
As highlighted earlier, the C4I project is a national project. It includes hardware 
and cyber security components.  All C4I projects will integrate all sensors together to 
compile a real-time tactical picture of threats in areas of operation. All data from distantly 
located sensors will be fused together to generate a joint picture of the tactical situation at 
the national level as well as at command levels. It may be relevant to mention that details 
regarding current status, capabilities, any maintenance or operational issues, upgrade 
plans and cyber security of these C4I projects are not publically available due to security 
sensitivities. However, it is an established fact that the system is maintained and 
upgraded regularly to meet national air defense and EW requirements. 
2. Saudi Naval Expansion Program-II (SNEP-II) 
The RSNF is currently in the planning phase of the Saudi Naval Expansion 
Program-II (SNEP-II). The SNEP-II program is expected to include surface warships 
with integrated air and missile defenses, helicopters, patrol craft and shore infrastructure. 
This program is part of the Kingdom’s naval buildup to counter Iranian threats, 
particularly asymmetric and air threats.  
The RSNF seems interested in the U.S. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) armed with 
Lockheed Martin’s Aegis air-defense system. Lockheed, with a proposed multi-mission 
version of its fast new LCS, Australia's Austal, Ltd. and General Dynamics Corporation 
are in competition for provisioning the LCS-type surface vessels. The RSNF may select 
the same design as the U.S. or it may customize a few design features to meet its 
operational requirement. The RSNF is interested in systems offered with ballistic missile 
defense capability due to Iranian ballistic missile threat. LCS ships can be configured for 
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any role by changing the relevant modules [34]. Induction of the LCS into the RSNF will 
provide leverage for meeting diverse operational requirements with a minimal number of 
platforms, including missile and Anti Air Warfare (AAW) defense capability. Moreover, 
remotely operated vehicles can provide significant EW advantages with their extended 
range and mobility. 
The RSNF has not yet finalized its weapons and sensors suite requirements as 
acquisition of the LCS is still in the planning phase.  However, the LCS can be fitted with 
a naval forward-looking infrared radar, the Raytheon SeaRAM anti-ship missile defense 
system, three super rapid bloom of chaff (SRBOC) and two Nulka decoy launchers. The 
countermeasures suite may include ES 3601 tactical radar ESM from EDO Corporation. 
The LCS may also be equipped with Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems’ integrated 
combat management system (ICMS), BAE Systems Electronic Systems’ radio 
communications system and CAE Marine Systems’ automated ship control system. The 
Link 16, Link 1, CEC, and Sea Giraffe radar can be installed on the main mast [ 35]. 
Inclusion of the LCS in the RSNF surface fleet will increase her EW capabilities, 
especially ECM, due to the availability of three SRBOCs and two Nulka decoy launchers. 
This decoy system will also play a vital role in overall missile defense capability for the 
fleet.  
E. THREAT ANALYSIS 
Saudi Arabia feels threatened by Iran’s nuclear aspirations.  Other regional states 
in the Middle East are also apprehensive about a nuclear-armed Iran. Iran has always 
portrayed herself as the guardian of Shiite Muslims all over the world. This image of Iran 
has emerged more clearly since the 1979 revolution. Therefore, Saudi Arabia along with 
other regional states, fears that a nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize already fragile 
Shiite-Sunni relations in the region. Shiite populations in mostly Sunni dominated states 
may resort to violent means for regime change with the help of Iran. The Bahrain unrest 
during the Arab Spring was indicative of this phenomenon. Open involvement of Iran in 
supporting the Shiite regime in Syria’s ongoing conflict further supports this theme. 
Moreover, Iran’s strategic location on the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz may 
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provoke a disruption to oil supplies for a limited period of time. This may have a 
devastating impact for the local as well as the global economy [36]. 
Saudi Arabia does not feel threatened immediately by Israel’s military upgrades 
due to the U.S. presence in the region and her strong ties with Saudi Arabia. This said, 
there is a diverging perception on the Palestine issue between the two allies.  Saudi 
Arabia has a clear stance that Israel has to withdraw from the Palestinian territories 
occupied during and since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. At present, Israel does not appear 
willing to yield to these demands. All Arab states including Saudi Arabia, therefore, have 
a sense of insecurity with regard to Israel, and this remains a point of contention between 
the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as well as other Arab states. Saudi Arabia cannot be fully 
assured that the U.S. will in all cases restrain Israeli aggression within the region, as the 
U.S. tries to balance the concerns of allies who are not themselves allies of each other. 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia must be concerned with any capabilities that Israel could bring 
to bear upon the Kingdom.  
The RSNF plan for acquiring EW capabilities may be focused on collecting 
electronic and signal intelligence to counter the threats posed by both Iran and Israel. The 
EW capabilities of Iran and Israel are included as Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, 
respectively. 
Iranian military doctrine is designed to target its adversaries' economic, political 
and military interests. Iran has publicly threatened to use its naval forces to close the 
Strait of Hormuz in response to increasing sanctions and in the event Iran is attacked. Iran 
has the capability to launch missiles against U.S. interests and her allies in the region in 
response to any attack by the U.S., NATO or any U.S. allies. Moreover, Iran's 
unconventional forces are well trained and present a formidable threat in the region. Iran 
continues to develop technological capabilities applicable to nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles that could be adapted to deliver nuclear weapons. Iran’s ballistic 
missiles program with an extended-range variant of the Shahab-3 poses a continuous 
threat to her regional adversaries [37].  
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The Iranian Navy has aspirations of becoming a “blue water” navy.  The Iranian 
Navy currently consists of three Kilo class submarines from Russia, 10 Houdong fast 
attack craft from China, domestically produced light submarine or swimmer delivery 
vehicles of various classes, naval aviation assets like the Mi-8 AMT (Mi-171) 
transport/attack helicopters, anti-ship sea skimming missiles equipped with modern anti-
ship missiles, guided missile frigates and modern destroyers. Iran is also acquiring new 
deployment capabilities to strike against warships in the Persian Gulf in the case of an 
armed conflict.  
Ever expanding Iranian naval capabilities are viewed in Riyadh with great 
concern. Iran has adequate naval strength to disrupt the smooth flow of oil supplies 
through the Strait of Hormuz in case of any conflict at least for a limited time. Any 
disruption in the smooth flow of oil supplies has a significant economic impact on Saudi 
Arabia. Many inbound imports vital for sustaining economic growth will also be 
threatened by any hostilities in the strait. It is matter of survival for the Kingdom and 
hence the RSNF to defeat any hegemonic designs focused against the Kingdom’s 
interests.  
It is interesting to note that Israel and Saudi Arabia have a mutual potential 
adversary, Iran, and a mutual ally, the United States. However, the phrase, the enemy of 
your enemy is your friend, does not fit well in this case.  Despite having a common 
adversary and a common friend, Saudi Arabia still feels threatened by Israel. However, it 
is also a relevant fact that development of force structure is normally aligned to deter the 
imminent threat due to high costs of modern sophisticated sensors and limited resources 
available at the discretion of the military leadership in developing countries like Saudi 
Arabia. SNEP II seems more aligned to counter the Iranian threat rather than the Israeli 
one. Selection of any sensor for acquisition or upgrade in future will, therefore, be 
dependent on this looming threat.  
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F. GAP ANALYSIS 
This capability gap analysis is aimed at exploring technological advances in the 
EW field to identify areas in need of improvement and to obtain the best future EW 
capability, offering the best performance at an affordable cost. 
Naval forces are organized to gain control of the sea in any event of hostilities to 
ensure the safety of national interests. Attainment of sea control is, therefore, the focal 
consideration of all maritime operations.  Without it, no maritime operation‒‒whether it 
is protection of a high value unit (HVU) in the escort role or power projection ashore‒‒
can be successful.  While no single maritime military element can perform this job, naval 
warships in modern day naval warfare can be better equipped apart from having inherent 
essentials of poise, sustained reach, and resilience for establishment and maintenance of 
sea control. Effective control of the electromagnetic environment (EME) with the help of 
EW technologies can be a force multiplier. Moreover, effective EW assets guard the fleet 
against any sophisticated threats in the form of electronic disruptions and jamming under 
an overall environment of network centric warfare (NCW).  
Protection of shipping and keeping the SLOCs open for vital petroleum, oil, 
lubricants (POL) supplies and maritime trade will be the primary mission of RSNF 
during hostilities. Effective protection of SLOCs can be ensured by deterring the attacks 
by enemy forces. To perform her mission effectively, rapid fusion of intelligence data 
from air, ground and surface sources will be required. This, in turn, is linked with C4I 
system capability to support such fusion and the technology of EW sensors and sensor 
platforms.  
Another aspect which needs to be considered during the analysis is the power of 
the purse.  The RSNF has found it prudent in past decades to modernize its fleet 
continuously and to acquire advanced weapons and sensors. But this may not be the case 
anymore. The Arab Spring has turned the tide and, hence, the priorities of national 
leadership. Future increases in population will require allocating considerable resources 
to meet domestic needs, such as education, housing and medical services, leaving behind 
fewer funds available for the acquisition of weapons and sensors.   
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G. RSNF ONBOARD EW ASSETS 
Deployment of EW assets is governed by the commander’s overall CONOPS. As 
highlighted earlier, RSNF does not have any aggressive designs. Although EW is a broad 
term that includes EA or ECM, ES or ESM and EP or ECCM, the RSNF has heavily 











ESM: Thomson CSF DR 4000 intercept 
ECM: Thomson CSF Janet 
Combat Data sys: Vega system 3CSEE 
Radars: 
Air/Surf/IFF: Thomson CSF sea Tiger (DRBV 15) 
Nav:  2 Racal Decca TM 1226 
FC:  Thomson CSF Castor IIB/C 
  Thomson DRBC 32 (for SAM) 
RSNF 





ESM: SLQ –32 (V) 1 
Radar: 
Air:  Lockhead SPS – 40B (320 Km) 
Surf:  ISC Cardion SPS – 55  




9 x Al Siddiq Class PCFG 
ESM: SLQ –32 (V) 1 
Radar:  
Surf:  ISC Cardion SPS – 55  
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FC:  Sperry Mk 92 (I/J Band) 
RSNF 
 
3 x Arriyad class  
( Mod. La Fayette Class)  
(Type F-3000S) 
ESM: Thomson CSF (DR 3000 S2) 
ECM: 2 CSEE Salamandre 
Radar: 
Air: Thomson CSF DRBV 26 C Jupiter II 
Surv/FC: Thomson CSF Arabel 3D 
FC:  Thomson CSF Castor II UJ 
Nav:  Racal Decca 1226 
RSAF 10 AWACS ground entry stations 
Command, Control, Communications, Computer 
and Intelligence (C4I) System 
The High-Speed Network (HSN) 
RSADF 17 AN/FPS-117 long-range radar 
06 AN/TPS-43 tactical radars 
RSLF AN/TPS-43 radars 
Improved HAWK air defense missile system 
Table 1.   RSNF onboard EW assets. 
H. CAPABILITY GAPS 
It is the information age and military leaders are learning that “it takes a network 
to fight a network” [38]. Availability of the right information at the right time in the right 
format and provided to the right man has become a fundamental planning factor among 
security establishments. NCW and FORCEnet concepts have become necessary to react 
effectively to any crisis. Accurate future planning can save scarce funds that would be 
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wasted by acquiring any system that does not offer any additional capability in the 
foreseeable future.  
The RSNF cannot continue to operate in isolation from continually developing 
technologies. As new technologies will keep coming online, interoperability and 
integration challenges within RSNF legacy systems and systems of other sister services 
will keep surfacing. The RSNF, therefore, will be required to attain the capability of 
effective integration of new systems with the old legacy systems. 
The RSNF needs to bridge the following gaps in her capability to meet its EW 
mission requirements effectively. Some of the following factors listed may not directly 
affect EW capability, but they have a relationship with efficacy of EW systems when 
viewed from a national security perspective.   
 Prevent HF/VHF radio communication interception 
 Improve HF/VHF/UHF DF capability 
 Prevent HF/VHF radio spectrum selective jamming  
 Prevent interception of microwave, troposcatter and satellite 
communication 
 Prevent interception of all kinds of data transmission, FAX and emails 
 Cyber Warfare (Logic bomb, microbe, etc.) defense against our 
communication systems (PASCOM, DEFCOM, PATCOMS and 
SATCOM) 
 ESM and ECM against non-communication emitters (i.e., radars and radar 
guided weapon systems) 
 Limited code breaking/decryption of encrypted voice and data 
transmission 
 Short duration electronic deception in a selected sector   
 Improved “jointness” with RSAF, Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces 
(RSADF), RSNG and RSLF in a variety of defense missions 
 Develop true interoperability with sister services and allied nations, 
especially the U.S., UK, France and GCC naval forces with respect to 
electronic intelligence gathering and sharing 
 Improved coastal defense capability through the installation and 
integration of new ESM and ELINT sensors along the coast 
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 Improved training standards in C4I, IT and EW fields, especially in the 
eastern fleet command 
 Improved ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
 Upgraded AWACS for better jointness, better ELINT/EW and maritime 
patrol aircraft (MPA) functioning 
 Improved netting and identification friend or foe (IFF) with RSAF, RSNG, 
RSADF, RSLF, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, GCC air forces, Saudi and 
GCC land-based air defenses 
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V. CURRENT TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS 
Technology is changing at a very fast pace. Military establishments find it more 
challenging to keep pace with advancing technology in every field. Switching cost from 
one technology to another in the military technology domain is very expensive. Military 
planners, therefore, dedicate considerable effort to monitoring current technological 
trends and updating their acquisition plans based on capability gap analysis in light of 
these ongoing trends. 
Military operations are becoming more complex in nature due to the doctrinal 
shift from conventional warfare to asymmetric warfare. Added complexity in combat 
operation will demand more technological support at the lowest level of force structure.  
Although EW planning and EW operations are conducted at higher organization levels, 
this doctrinal shift has still impacted current technological trends in EW. Current trends 
in the EW domain encompass electro-optical warfare, use of microprocessor based 
systems, elevated platforms, jam-proof radars, employment of satellites and analysis 
equipment.  
Being a very expensive technology, most of the developments in EW have taken 
place only in a few leading countries and organizations including America, Russia, China 
and NATO countries, which provide the role model for others to follow. KSA is in the 
process of acquiring state-of-the-art EW equipment in the pursuit of safeguarding her 
command and control structure from potential threats by the regional countries. To 
maintain its operational readiness and effectiveness, RSNF is bound to take suitable 
measures by improving her EW capabilities and maturing her concepts, doctrines and 
organizations in light of new challenges vis-a-vis available and affordable technology. 
A. REGIONAL TRENDS 
1. United States of America 
The U.S. military began its efforts to combine the tactics of EW with intelligence, 
deception, surprise, command and control, electronic suppression and electronic 
protection in late 1960s. The Army doctrine has been geared towards gathering signals 
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intelligence and also towards wrecking the enemy’s command, control, communication 
and intelligence systems. The Air Force doctrine is intended to disrupt the enemy’s air 
defense systems of radars, fighters and missiles. The Navy doctrine is focused on 
allowing the Navy to get off the first effective in any engagement while wrecking an 
enemy’s sensors and communications. The Department of Defense (DoD) spends an 
enormous amount every year on highly classified “Black Programs.” 
2. Russia 
The Russian military doctrine for the use of the electromagnetic spectrum is 
called radioelektronnaya bor’ba (REB), which is translated as radio-electronic struggle. 
Russians combine the tactics of EW, surprise, deception and fire power to create to a 
unique doctrine that shapes the operation of the Russian Army. REB includes the actions 
to disrupt an enemy’s use of the spectrum and actions to protect friendly use of the 
spectrum. It incorporates razvedka (reconnaissance and intelligence) and maskirovka 
(concealment and deception). In peace time REB is intended to help conceal Russian 
military capabilities, deceive Western intelligence analysts and acquire training for war 
and low intensity conflicts. In war time its mission is to paralyze enemy command, 
control and communication and protect friendly use of the spectrum. After the downfall 
of the Soviet Union the doctrine of the REB shifted from offensive to defensive in nature. 
Russian definition of defensive sufficiency intends to reduce its military forces to the 
minimum required for reliable defense of the motherland. REB operates in close 
cooperation with KGB. Its scope includes radio, radio technical, radar, electro-optical, 
radio-thermal, laser, television, acoustic and hydro-acoustic intelligence.  
3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
The NATO Electronic Warfare Advisory Committee (NEWAC) was established 
in 1966 to support the Military Committee, the NATO Strategic Commanders and 
member nations by acting as a joint, multinational body to promote an effective NATO 
EW capability. It monitors progress achieved nationally and within the Integrated 
Military Command Structure in implementing agreed EW measures. It is responsible for 
the development of NATO's EW policy, doctrine, operations and educational 
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requirements and contributes to the development of command and control concepts. 
Electronic warfare capabilities are a key factor in the protection of military forces and in 
monitoring compliance with international agreements and are essential for peacekeeping 
and other tasks undertaken by the Alliance. NEWAC also assists in introducing NATO's 
EW concepts to partner countries in the framework of Partnership for Peace.   
4. China 
China has developed the idea of Special Operation Forces (SOF) to combat EW. 
Since 1997, SOFs (Quantou Budui, fist units) have carried out many EW missions at the 
national and international level. During the same period, Chinese companies began to 
market man-portable EW systems, suitable for employment by SOF against C2 facilities. 
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) definition of EW includes physical attacks on the 
full range of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, sensors and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and networks. In fact, the terms EW and information 
warfare (IW) seem to be used almost interchangeably by the PLA. Ground-based EW 
systems have a limited range due to propagation losses, terrain masking and other 
obstacles. SOF teams are employed by ground, air or naval means to infiltrate the 
enemy's operational and strategic depth. In addition to traditional EW actions, Chinese 
authorities have begun to comment on the possibility of using special operations to attack 
automated command networks.   
B. MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS IN EW 
The primary reason why EW is becoming more and more complicated is because 
defenders have learned how to adapt to various EW strategies.  Radars have become 
more powerful, more discriminating and more agile.  Command and control networks 
have become more resilient and responsive.  Surface-to-Air missiles have become 
smarter.  Improvements in aircraft radar and radar-guided air-to-air missiles allow for 
longer-range engagements of multiple aircrafts and have pushed the aerial engagement 
arena well beyond visual range (BVR).  Vastly improvised infrared (IR) guided missiles 
are now capable of head on, high-angle, off-foresight engagement that give no indication 
to the target.   
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New technologies such as data fusion are emerging to provide an overall picture 
of information from a variety of active and passive sensors.  There is an increasing use of 
lasers for both protection and offense.  Ongoing technological trends in EW can be 
organized in three areas.. 
C. NEW TRENDS IN ESM 
The telescope was the first passive information instrument.  Since then 
tremendous breakthroughs in the area of combat identification have been made and are 
still attracting most attention.  However, the key to ESM systems or what separates the 
leading ESM systems from the second string is the database. Database storage capacity 
and its ability to carry out all the parametric analysis of all signals that are likely to be 
encountered. The information about these technologies in the following sections has been 
gathered from Internet, global security websites, military technology websites, Jane’s 
Defense Weekly, Jane’s Defense Fighting Ships, and Gulf military balance 2011 report. 
1. Acousto-Optic 
Acousto-Optic receivers with their advantages of wide instantaneous coverage of 
the entire band are becoming increasingly popular. An improved acousto-optic radar 
warning receiver will provide faster and more accurate warning of hostile radar activity. 
Optical signal processing techniques allow the receiver to simultaneously handle a wide 
range of frequencies and analyze several signals in parallel while providing frequency 
resolution precise enough to separate hostile signals from friendly ones.  
2. Improvement in Antenna Design 
One major breakthrough in the ESM technology is the improved antenna design. 
The antenna design widely depends on the type of ESM equipment and the platform on 
which they are mounted.  For obvious reasons, aircraft antennas have to be small and 
lightweight and consequently provide less facility than the ground-based or ship-borne 
systems.  For the latter applications, a wide variety of passive and active dipoles and DF 
antennas, both directional and omni-directional are employed.  Submarines have a 
 53 
particular need for antennas that give the least possible radar cross-section to avoid 
detection and are sufficiently compact to be mounted in the restricted space on the sail. 
D. NEW TRENDS IN ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES 
In the future, there will be a great many more smart weapons and as these systems 
are widely proliferated, we will find it much more difficult to counter them. 
1. Missile-Borne ECM Technology 
The Missile-Borne ECM Technology (MBET) program is a comprehensive 
program designed to provide critical information to decision-makers and others regarding 
the ability of modern Air and Missile Defense systems to engage and destroy an 
adversary's Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) in the presence of missile-borne ECM.  An 
outgrowth of the MBET program is the Tactical Ballistic Missile-Borne Jammer 
(TBMBJ), which is the first demonstration of a Threat-level ECM device being integrated 
into a Threat-representative target while maintaining full capability of the target delivery 
system. 
2. Advanced Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) Pod 
The ALQ-131 is an advanced ECM pod designed to provide an aircraft self-
protection against radar threats. The ALQ-131 accomplishes this by responding with a 
combination of noise, repeater or transponder electronic jamming techniques. The pod 
weighs 600 pounds, with modular design for multiple frequency band capability. It has an 
ability to be quickly re-programmed against changing threats. The present TBMBJ 
system is a responsive frequency-agile system capable of producing a wide range of 
threat-representative ECM waveforms. With simple electronic module changes, the 
system can be made to produce any number of different ECM waveforms. With simple 
programmable changes, the system has the ability to transmit any of these waveforms in 
several modes to include barrage, blinking and responsive.  
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3. Advanced Airborne Expendable Decoy (AAED)  
AAED is a towed expendable intended to provide a radar target decoy to an 
incoming missile. The AAED can be manually operated as a stand-alone device, or it can 
be integrated and controlled by the ALE-47. This expendable towed decoy is designed to 
provide countermeasures against radar guided anti-aircraft threats, thereby increasing the 
survivability of tactical aircraft. The decoy is deployed when required and cut free before 
landing. The program is in the full rate production (FRP) phase. 
4. Laser Based Decoys 
The latest generation of Anti-Missile ECM use laser-based transmitters to create 
multiple lines of decoy energy in the missile bands.  Perhaps this class of system, used in 
conjunction with closed loop infrared counter measures (IRCM) and flares, will buy 
some time against the truly imaging-seeker threats coming down the road. 
5. UAVs 
Many countries worldwide are employing Reconnaissance, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RISTA) systems for the detection and location of 
targets. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) will conduct RISTA against tactical and 
operational targets throughout the theatre. UAVs include drones, characterized by pre-
programmed flight paths and patterns, and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). Each can 
perform a variety of missions, ranging from reconnaissance and surveillance to attack and 
electronic warfare.  
In addition to information gathering (still the dominant function), UAV roles will 
include electronic combat, decoy, ground attack, and suppression of enemy air defense 
(SEAD). A significant new capability involves the direct linkage of a reconnaissance 
UAV to a fire direction center. This linkage provides real-time information to 
commanders, followed by immediate fire and damage assessment. UAVs are also good 
candidates for stealth technology and spin-off technologies from Cruise Missiles (CM) 
developmental programs. The X-47B stealth drone is set to be the world's first unmanned, 
robot aircraft piloted by artificial intelligence rather than a remote human operator. The 
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program is currently in the engineering, manufacturing and development (EMD) phase. 
Another program also in the EMD phase is that of the unmanned jet MQ-4C Triton which 
is capable of flying 11,500 miles without refueling.  The MQ-4C will be used for high 
altitude maritime surveillance. Successful induction of the X-47B drone and MQ-4C 
unmanned jet in the U.S. Navy will revolutionize the role of the drone in naval warfare 
due to their extended range. 
E. NEW TRENDS IN ELECTRONIC COUNTER – COUNTER MEASURES 
1. Millimetric Frequencies 
There is a growing tendency to shift the frequency coverage of electronic warfare 
beyond the radar and communication frequencies to cover great areas of the spectrum.  
New threats based on millimetric wave radar and electro-optical guidance have already 
spurred the development of EW hardware able to cover these frequencies.  Radar 
frequencies in the 35 GHz and 94 GHz windows, which are above the conventional radar 
band, were used in the Gulf War. 
2. Passive Surveillance Systems 
A great deal of development effort has recently gone into the use of passive 
surveillance systems for detection.  These are either optical or infrared in design and, 
because they do not transmit, are not vulnerable to anti-radiation missiles.  They are, 
however, very limited in range and are still vulnerable to infrared or optically guided 
missiles.  A number of the latter type has been in operational use for some years, using a 
television camera in the nose.  The defense against these is normally to use a smoke 
screen and several systems, which combine the deployment of smoke, chaff and infrared 
flares currently in use. 
3. Multi-Static Radar for Improved and Stealth Detection 
In order to survive and do their job, radar stations of the future will have to be 
difficult to attack with guided missiles or to jam electronically.  They must also be 
capable of detecting objects, which use stealth technology.  Radar manufacturers are 
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working on multi-static radar, with transmitters and receivers separated geographically, 
as one of a number of solutions to survivability and performance. 
4. Smart Skin (No Antenna)  
An average modern fighter has no fewer than 30-35 RF antennas distributed over 
its surface, performing functions such as communications, navigation, identification, 
threat warning, active jamming and target detection.  There are so many of them that their 
size is to be kept to a minimum to cater for aerodynamics, drag, low radar cross section 
(RCS) and weight considerations, which in most cases leads to a compromise in 
performance.  The U.S. Air Force has been working on this problem since the early 1980s 
and has been able to design, construct and test an embedded wide-band antenna, a so-
called “Smart Skin.”  Not only are these antennas large, but they also have steerable 
beams for much higher performance than conventional antennas. Japan has recently 
tested a smart skin phased-array antenna for aircraft. 
5. Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) 
The IDECM system is a radio frequency, self-protection electronic 
countermeasure suite resident on F/A-18 aircraft. The system is comprised of onboard 
and off-board components. The onboard components receive and process radar signals 
and can employ onboard and/or off-board jamming components in response to identified 
threats. IDECM Block-3 is currently in the full rate production phase.  There are four 
IDECM variants: Block I (IB-1), Block II (IB-2), Block III (IB-3), and Block IV (IB-4).  
F. THE WAY FORWARD FOR RSNF 
Services all over the world are facing new challenges in an uncertain and dynamic 
global environment. Forces need to leverage innovative concepts, cutting-edge 
technologies, and joint-integrated operations to meet current and future challenges 
effectively and economically.  RSNF cannot blindly follow the footsteps of leading 
navies of the world, especially in the acquisition of EW systems. The basic and foremost 
reason is that there are vast differences in existing weapons and sensors infrastructure. 
The U.S. Navy, NATO, China and India have legacy systems as per their peculiar 
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security and integration requirements.  Full integration of newly acquired systems with 
old legacy systems is a very basic consideration for RSNF future planners. KSA does not 
have any impressive capability in the field of integration. Due to a very thin in-house 
defense manufacturing industry, systems in service are of different origins, having 
different interface protocols. RSNF, therefore, needs to analyze structural, organizational, 
doctrinal, training, supportability, maintainability and logistical issues along with 
operational requirements. After due deliberation on all these aspects, RSNF is expected to 
have few feasible options.  
RSNF is a regional force and has a limited scope of operation without any 
offensive design. The essential requirements of EW systems vary from those of leading 
navies because of their quest for global presence versus the RSNF posture of a regional 
defensive force.  Any system in service with leading navies may not be cost effective for 
the RSNF because of high acquisition costs and subsequent life cycle costs for 
maintenance and operation.  
Saudi Arabia is one of the 10 largest defense systems and equipment markets 
worldwide. Superior EW systems enhance the survivability of highly expensive surface 
platforms. Since naval systems upgrades and modernization programs are less expensive 
than overall platform replacement, selection of affordable technological advancements 
will play a key role for enhancing existing EW systems capabilities. 
As per the global EW system market report 2012- 2022, the United States 
represents a major market for EW systems. Defense equipment manufacturers are 
expected to produce thousands of EW systems such as ECM systems, ESM systems, and 
radar warning receivers (RWRs). The production rate is expected to rise significantly 
over a period of ten years, driven by the increased demand from military forces and the 
increasing danger across the global waterways [39]. As a result, the price of EW systems 
may go down due to economies of scale. RSNF may, therefore, delay acquisitions of EW 
systems where possible to leverage the benefit of mass production.  
Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics 
and Raytheon are the leading global defense suppliers. U.S.-centric defense suppliers 
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include Alliant Techsystems, Inc., Communications & Power Industries, DRS 
Technologies, General Dynamics Corporation, ITT Corporation, L-3 Communications 
Corporation, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Raytheon 
Company, Rockwell Collins, SRA International, and The Boeing Company. RSNF may 
establish a committee composed of officers from EW, acquisition, logistics and 
headquarters staff to visit these firms’ facilities and evaluate the systems being 
manufactured. 
Booz Allen Hamilton has recently been registered by the KSA Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry to pursue business opportunities in the Kingdom in support of 
domestic economic diversification. The firm has also been assisting the RSNF for more 
than three decades now. Booz Allen is a world leader in the area of intelligence-based 
cyber security along with management services experience. The firm is also being 
awarded a contract as part of SNEP including support for electronic warfare. RSNF may 
capitalize on the firm’s expertise to short list EW systems best suited for RSNF 
operational requirements. 
The association of old crows (AOC) is an independent, nonprofit, international 
professional association promoting public understanding in the science and practice of 
EW, SIGINT and related disciplines. The AOC is working with the King Abdulaziz City 
for Science and Technology (KACST) to organize the third Saudi Arabian EW 
Symposium in November, 2013. Delegates of leading EW systems manufacturing firms 
will be attending and exhibiting their products and literature. RSNF may nominate a team 
of officers from the operations branch with EW specialization and representatives from 
EW Directorate RSNF Headquarters to attend this symposium. This will help them learn 
about the current EW capabilities of the international electronic warfare industry and 
latest developments in thinking, products and services in EW. 
BAE Systems has been recently been awarded a contract for upgrading 70 state-
of-the-art Digital Electronic Warfare Systems (DEWS)/Common Missile Warning 
Systems (CMWS) onboard F-15S fighter jets by the RSAF.  The work is expected to be 
completed by 2018. RSNF may consult RSAF authorities for learning from their 
experience and can negotiate its requirements with BAE systems. This arrangement will 
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not only save money but will help in the longer term from the integration, logistic 
support, standardization, maintenance, training and spare parts supportability perspective 
also. 
Additionally, Advance Electronic Company (AEC) is a Saudi private sector 
company that serves the defense needs of the Kingdom. The AEC charter includes 
design, development, manufacturing, the provision of upgrades and logistical support of 
electronic products and systems. The firm has experience working on Electronic Warfare 
System ALG135EW and Radar Warning System ALR-56C RWR.  RSNF may contract 
with AEC, and AEC may subcontract any of the jobs to the original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs). AEC has a Military Systems Business Unit (MSBU) which has 
experience working on diverse major military programs in partnership with leading 
international OEMs. This arrangement will support the Saudiazation effort and long-term 
local technical and logistical support. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Today there is a fundamental shift from conventional war fighting to the 
asymmetric nature of warfare. Militaries are more focused on conducting military 
operations short of war or military operations other than war.  Ever deteriorating regional 
security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) demands a higher level of 
preparedness from the RSNF to meet any challenges that arise. EW equipment can help 
to prevent the situation from escalating beyond desired levels by providing a 
comprehensive and timely awareness of situations, so that politicians and commanders 
can determine appropriate reactions and implement them while the situation is still 
manageable. This can only be realized with the help of a very powerful infrastructure of 
electronic warfare facilities, robust command and control centers and extremely reliable 
communication channels. 
The EW requirements of the RSNF vary from those of leading navies of the world 
because of the RSNF’s posture as a regional defensive force.  Any system in service with 
leading navies may not be cost-effective for RSNF because of high acquisition costs and 
subsequent life cycle costs for maintenance and operation. RSNF has to make tradeoffs 
between mission requirements and affordability. Naval systems upgrades and 
modernization programs are less expensive than overall platform replacement; selection 
of affordable technological upgrades for enhancing existing RSNF EW systems 
capabilities is a challenge for RSNF. 
Saudi Arabia is progressing as an economic as well as a military power in the 
Middle East. The Royal Saudi Armed Forces in general and RSNF in particular shoulder 
a heavy responsibility for guarding national interests from any threat. This mission needs 
statement demands RSNF military hardware modernization. Integration of newly 
acquired systems with old legacy systems remains a basic consideration for RSNF due to 
a very thin in-house defense hardware manufacturing industrial base. KSA does not have 
any impressive capability in the field of integration. RSNF is, therefore, constrained to 
analyze structural, organizational, doctrinal, training, supportability, maintainability and 
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logistical issues along with operational requirements during the acquisition planning 
process.  
At the same time, KSA needs to consider the way forward without too much 
delay. Saudi Arabia feels threatened by Iran’s nuclear aspirations and Israel. Iran has 
always portrayed herself as the guardian of Shiite Muslims all over the world. Therefore, 
Saudi Arabia along with other regional states fears that a nuclear-armed Iran would 
destabilize the already fragile Shiite-Sunni relations in the region. These fears are 
supported by many of the current Iranian foreign policy moves in the international arena. 
The Bahrain unrest during the Arab Spring was indicative of this phenomenon. Open 
involvement by Iran in support of the Shiite regime in Syria’s ongoing conflict further 
supports this theme. The Iranian missile program is another major concern, and the RSNF 
needs to prepare accordingly to face this threat. 
Furthermore, while Saudi Arabia enjoys good relations with the U.S., there is a 
diverging perception of the Palestine issue between the two allies.  Saudi Arabia has a 
clear stance that Israel has to withdraw from the Palestinian territories occupied during 
and since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. However, Israel does not appear willing to yield to 
these demands. All Arab states including Saudi Arabia, therefore, have a sense of 
insecurity with regard to Israel, and this remains a point of contention between the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia as well as other Arab states. Saudi Arabia cannot be fully assured that 
the U.S. will in all cases restrain Israeli aggression within the region as the U.S. tries to 
balance the concerns of allies who are not themselves allies of each other. Therefore, 
Saudi Arabia must be concerned with any capabilities that Israel could bring to bear upon 
the Kingdom. 
The RSNF is undergoing thorough modernization and extension programs. As 
new technologies are coming online, interoperability and integration challenges within 
RSNF legacy systems and systems of other sister services are becoming more prominent. 
Effective integration of these new systems with the legacy systems, sister services and 
interoperability with allied regional and extra regional forces is the biggest gap. The 
RSNF needs to bridge the gaps highlighted in Chapter IV to meet its EW mission 
requirements effectively. 
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As part of the modernization and upgrade programs, KSA is in the process of 
acquiring state-of-the-art EW equipment which is a solid step forward. To maintain its 
operational readiness and effectiveness, RSNF is committed to take suitable measures by 
improving her EW capabilities and maturing her concepts, doctrines and organizations in 
the light of new challenges vis-a-vis available and affordable technology. Technological 
trends, leading EW systems manufacturers, available high tech systems and the way 
forward for the RSNF have been discussed in previous chapters to highlight the contours 
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APPENDIX A.  IRAN WE ASSETS 
PLATFORM SENSOR 





 Squid Head; radar warning. Quad Loop D/F 
 
Radar: 
 Surf : Snoop Tray MRP-25 (I band) 
 
3 X Alvand ( Vosper Mk 5) Class (FFG) 
 




 Decca RDL 2ABC(radar warning) 
 
Radar: 
 Air/Surf:  Plessey AWS 1(E/F band) 
 Surf :  Racal Decca 1226 (I band) 
 Nav :   Racal Decca 629 (I/J band) 
 FC :  Contraves Sea Hunter 
 
3 X KAMAN (Combattane II)  
( Fast Attack Craft) 
 
ESM :   
 Thomson-CSF TMV 433 Dalia 
 
Radar: 
 Surf/ FC:  Signaal  WM28 (I/J band) 
 Nav :   Racal Decca 1226 (I band) 
 
3 X THONDOR (HOUDONG)  
( Fast Attack Craft) 
 
ESM:    
 Thomson-CSF TMV 433 Dalia  
 
Radar:  
 Surf: China SR-47A (I band) 
 Nav: Rice Lamp Type 341(I/J band) 





Radar:        
 Air/Surf: SPS – 6C(D band) 
 Surf : Racal Decca  (I band) 
 Nav :  Raytheon 1650 (I/J band) 
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APPENDIX B.  ISRAEL EW ASSETS 
PLATFORM SENSOR 




EW Suite & Decoys:  
 
 Argon ST AN/SLQ-25 Nixie decoy 
 Elbit chaff rocket launchers 
 Rafael RF corner reflector 
 Elisra NS-9003A/9005 RWR 
 
Radar: 
 Elta EL/M-2218S air search radar 
 Elta EL/M-2221 fire-control radar 
 
2 X  Aliyah class FAC(M) 
 
  Aliya 
 Geula 
EW Suite & Decoys:  
 
 Elbit chaff rocket launchers 
 Elisra NS-9003A/9005 RWR 
 
Radar: 
 Thales Neptune air & surface search radar 
 Selenia Orion fire-control radar  
  












EW Suite & Decoys:  
 
 Elbit chaff rocket launchers 
 Elisra NS-9003A/9005 RWR 
 
Radar: 
 Thales Neptune air & surface search radar 
 ELTA EL/M-2221 fire-control radar 
3 X R E S H E F  c l a s s   
( Fast Attack Craft) Missile 
 Nitzachon 
 Atzmaut  
 
 
ESM:    
 Nil  
 
Radar:  
 Surface/air search radar Neptune/S.P.S 
 Fire-control radar - Orion 
 
5 x Dolphin class submarine 
 Dolphin 
 Livyathan  
 Tekumah  
EW: 
 TIMNEX 4 CH ELINT/targeting set RWR/DF 
 
Combat System: 
 STN Atlas ISUS 90-55 combat system  
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 Tannin  
 Rahav  
2 x 707 ELINT 
2 x 707 PHALCON AEW 
3 x Beech KING AIR B200 
 
 Cheek-antenna array 




 Interception of our HF/VHF radio communication 
 DF of HF/VHF/UHF 
 Selective jamming of HF/VHF radio spectrum 
 Interception of microwave, troposcatter and satellite communication 
 Interception of all kinds of data transmission, FAX and e-mails 
 Cyber Warfare (Logic bomb, microbe etc) against our communication system (PASCOM, 
DEFCOM, PATCOMS and SATCOM) 
 ESM and ECM against non-communication emitters i.e. Radars and Radar guided weapon systems 
 Limited code breaking/de-crypt ion of encrypted voice and data transmission 
 Short duration electronic deception in a selected sector.  
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